Stackelberg model for linear marginal costs by Ioan, Catalin Angelo & Ioan, Alin Cristian
ŒCONOMICA 
 67 
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods 
 
Stackelberg Model for Linear Marginal Costs 
 
Cătălin Angelo Ioan1, Alin Cristian Ioan2 
 
Abstract: The paper treats the Stackelberg where marginal costs corresponding to two companies are 
linear. It also examines the profitability of the merger of the two companies in order to maximize the 
profit. 
Keywords: Stackelberg, marginal costs 
JEL Classification: L20 
 
1. Introduction 
Let two companies A and B. Consider first that the company A is a leading quantity. 
If it will produce good QA units of a good, then the company B will adjust its 
production at QB=f(QA)units of the same good (f being called the reaction function). 
The sale price is dependent on the total quantity of goods reached the market. Be so: 
p=p(QA+QB) 
the price per unit of good. 
The A company must establish a level of production related to the reaction of B, 
because through its production realized will determine the selling price of the 
product. Similarly, firm B will adjust its production according to A, because at a 
higher or lower production, the price will change and therefore the profit of the 
company. 
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2 The Analysis 
Consider the function of price (the inverse demand function) of the form: 
p(Q)=a-bQ, a,b0 
Also, consider that the marginal costs for A and B are linear: 
  AAA QQCm  ,   BBB QQCm  , A , B 0 
Let also the profit of the leader: 
  )Q(CTQQQp)Q( AAABAAA  =   )Q(CTQQQbaQ AAABAA  = 
  )Q(CTQbQabQ AAAB
2
A   
Because QB=f(QA) we have: 
  )Q(CTQ)Q(fQp)Q( AAAAAAA  = )Q(CT)Q(fbQaQbQ AAAAA
2
A   
Let consider now, also, the profit of the satellite: 
  )Q(CTQQQp)Q( BBBBABB  =   )Q(CTQQQbaQ BBBBAB  = 
  )Q(CTQbQabQ BBBA
2
B   
The extreme condition for the profit of A is: 
0)Q(Cm)Q('fbQ)Q(bfabQ2
Q
)Q(
AAAAAA
A
AA 


 
or other, taking into account of the marginal cost expression: 
0Q)Q('fbQ)Q(bfabQ2 AAAAAAA   
and those for the satellite B: 
0)Q(CmbQabQ2
Q
)Q(
BBAB
B
BB 


 
or, taking into account of the marginal cost expression: 
0QbQabQ2 BBBAB   
Considering therefore the production of the leader QA being given, it follows that the 
production of the satellite satisfies the condition: 
ŒCONOMICA 
 69 
B
AB
B
b2
bQa
Q


  
Varying now the production QA we have that QB=f(QA)=
B
AB
b2
bQa


 from where, 
the question of leader’s profit maximization is: 
0Q
b2
Qb
b2
bQa
babQ2 AAA
B
A
2
B
AB
A 




  
or other: 
  BABA
2
BABAB*
A
b2b2
bb2aab
Q


  
We obtain now for the satellite B: 
B
Ab*
B
b2
bQa
Q


 =
      
    BABA2B
BBAABBBbA
2
BABABA
2
b2b2b2
b22b32ab2b


The condition for the leader to have a higher production than the satellite returns to 
*
B
*
A QQ   which is equivalent to: 
            0ab53a2b56a ABBABABBABBAABB
2
BA 
From   AAA QQCm  ,   BBB QQCm   we obtain after a simple 
integration: 
CTA(Q)= AA
2A QQ
2


, CTB(Q)= BB
2B QQ
2


 with A,B0 
Returning to the profits of both firms A and B we have: 
   *AA*A*B*A*AA QCTQQQp)Q(  =
  A*AA2*AA*A*B2*A QQ
2
QbQabQ 

 = 
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    
 B
ABA
*
AABABB
2*
ABABA
2
b22
2b4Qb2baab2Qb2b2


     *BB*B*B*A*BB QCTQQQpQ  =   B*BB2*BB*B*B*A*B QQ
2
QQQbaQ 

 = 
 
  BB
2*
AB
b22
bQa



 
Suppose now that the two firms merge to form a monopoly with the same total 
production: 
Q*= *AQ +
*
BQ  
the price p=  *B*A QQp  =  *Qp  keeping also constant. 
The profit of the monopoly is: 
( *Q )=(p-CTM( *Q )) *Q  
where CTM( *Q )=
*
B
*
A
*
BB
*
AA
QQ
)Q(CT)Q(CT


 is the average cost of the production of the 
monopoly. 
We have therefore: 
(Q*)=  *B*A*
B
*
A
*
BB
*
AA QQ
QQ
)Q(CT)Q(CT
p 









 =      *BB*AA*B*A QCTQCTQQp  = 
  B*BB2*BBA*AA2*AA*B*A QQ
2
QQ
2
QQba 



 = 
 
 
 
  BA
B
*
Ab
B2
B
2*
AbB*
AA
2*
A
A
b2
bQa
b
b2
bQa
2
aQbQ
2








  
But: 
   *BB*AA QQ  = 
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    
  BAB
B
2
B
2*
AABABB
2*
ABABA
2
b22
a2aQb2b2a2Qb2b



from where: 
     *AB*AA*B*A QQQQ  = 
         
 2B
B
2
BBB
2
BB
*
ABBB
2
B
2*
A
2
B
b2
abbbabab2aQbab2b2bQbb


where: 
  BABA
2
BABAB*
A
b2b2
bb2aab
Q


  
If       0QQQQ *AB*AA*B*A   then, when the two companies will merge, 
the profit will increase. 
 
3 Conclusions 
The assumptions made in the given hypothesis is plausible because in a reasonable 
time, the marginal cost can be assumed linear. Also, the terms of the merger of two 
companies in order to increase profitability are necessary to be known, because in a 
highly competitive market conditions and strong competing firms, an atomization of 
the production leading to low profits or even the disappearance of firms from the 
market. 
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